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Abstract 
In this paper  we present an empirical  analysis  of the  "credit-cost channel"  (CCC) of monetary 
policy transmission. This model combines bank credit supply, as a means whereby monetary policy 
affects economic activity ("credit channel"), and interest rates on loans as a cost to firms ("cost 
channel"). The thrust of the model is that the CCC makes both aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply  dependent  on  monetary  policy.  As  a  consequence  a)  credit  market  conditions  (e.g.  risk 
spreads)  are  important  sources  and  indicators  of  macroeconomic  shocks,  b)  the  real  effects  of 
monetary  policy  are  larger  and  persistent.  We  have  applied  the  Johansen-Juselius  CVAR 
methodology to Italy and Germany in the "hard" EMS period and in the EMU period. The short-run 
and long-run effects of the CCC are detectable for both countries in both periods. We have also 
replicated the Johansen-Juselius technique for the simulation of rule-based stabilization policy for 
both Italy and Germany in the EMU period. As a result, we have found confirmation that inflation-
targeting by way of inter-bank rate control, grafted onto the estimated CCC model, would stabilize 
inflation through structural shifts of the stochastic equilibrium paths of  both inflation and output. 
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 1 Introduction 
 
  Analysis of the channels through which monetary policy operates and affects nominal 
as well as real macroeconomic variables has long been a matter of research. The issue is of 
general interest, but it is particularly important for monetary policy conduct in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) because it is well known that such transmission channels may 
differ across countries with different economic structures and institutional legacies (e.g. 
Dornbusch et al. (1998), Angeloni et al. (2003)).   
  A  good  starting  point  is  the  distinction  between  "market-based"  and  "bank-based" 
economies  popularized  by  scholars  in  comparative  financial  systems.  Market-based 
economies are typically associated with the traditional demand-side effects of interest rates 
mainly affecting private sector's expenditure directly through efficient financial markets. 
Bank-based economies are instead characterized by private expenditure largely dependent 
on bank credit, with relatively underutilized financial markets. Notably, today's reference 
model adopted by the major central banks - the so called New Keynesian model with sticky 
prices (e.g. Woodford (2003)) - takes an efficient market-based structure for granted and 
gives  no  role  to  play  to  banks
1.  Since  major  continental  economies  such  as  those  of 
Germany,  France,  Italy,  and  Spain  have  long  been  regarded  as  typical  bank-based 
economies, it seems important to understand monetary transmission in economies of this 
type, and to monitor possible modifications away from bank-based structures resulting from 
monetary and financial integration. To date, empirical analyses of different transmission 
mechanisms in the EMU have delivered mixed and uncertain results (e.g. Angeloni et al. 
(2003), Angeloni and Ehrmann (2003)).  
  This state of the art may be due to limitations in the short-lived data set of the EMU as 
well as to  some  deficiencies in the  theoretical framework adopted.  Study  of  monetary 
policy  in  connection  with  the  banking  system  has  a  long  tradition  (Trautwein  (2000)), 
which  was  revived  and  completely  refounded  with  modern  methodological  tools  in the 
1980s when the economics of imperfect capital markets was developed (e.g. Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (2003)). The specificity of bank-based economies was rooted in the asymmetric 
information between  private  borrowers  and  lenders  that  prevents development of  direct 
financial relationships. Against this background, a major contribution to monetary policy 
has  consisted  in  the  so-called  "credit  channel",  which  refers  to  the  means  by  which 
monetary policy affects aggregate demand via the credit supply of intermediary institutions 
(see e.g. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for surveys). A first 
round of empirical research on European countries tended to confirm the importance of the 
credit channel (e.g. Fiorentini and Tamborini (2001) for a survey). However, this class of 
models had  the  empirical shortcoming  that  they  made  it  difficult  to  identify the causal 
direction between aggregate demand and outstanding credit. 
  Another related research path has pursued the idea that the credit channel of monetary 
                                                 
1 The current financial crisis has seriously shaken the reliability of this foundation of the New Keynesian 
model: see e.g. Crockett (2003), Christiano et al. (2007b), Leijonhufvud (2007).  
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policy  may  affect  not  only  aggregate  demand  but  also  aggregate  supply.  The  financial 
constraints of firms may limit the demand for physical capital as well as for circulating 
capital. Hence, in a bank-dependent economy, also current production comes to depend on 
the terms and conditions of credit availability. This creates a so-called "credit-cost channel" 
(CCC) of monetary policy, meaning that the bank interest rate is also a production cost to 
firms.  Greenwald  and  Stiglitz  (1988,  1993),  Christiano  and  Eichenbaum  (1992),  and 
Christiano et al. (1997) provide early examples of this CCC explicitly related to firms being 
financed  by  intermediaries  in  a  context  of  imperfect  capital  markets
2.  Christiano  et  al. 
(2007a), Pfajfar and Santoro (2007), Tamborini (2009), and De Fiore and Tristani (2009), 
exemplify developments of this line of inquiry, showing that blending the credit and cost 
channels may provide a consistent framework for monetary policy analysis in bank-based 
economies and overcome the weaknesses of the two separate approaches.  
  The  thrust  of  this  class  of  CCC  models  is  that  monetary  policy  affects  economic 
activity  as  policy-induced  changes  in  bank  interest  rates,  given  rational  expectations of 
future inflation, exert a real credit-cost effect on firms that shifts labour demand and output 
supply in parallel with labour supply and aggregate demand. Under suitable treatment of 
capital market imperfections, a specific role for credit risk (re)emerges both for business 
cycle analysis and for monetary policy design (e.g. Tamborini (2009), De Fiore and Tristani 
(2009)). Moreover, joint consideration of aggregate demand and supply effects in a general 
equilibrium  set-up  makes  it  possible  to  control  for  a  variety  of  real-nominal  effects  of 
monetary policy. Put briefly, the key differences made by the CCC with respect to the 
traditional transmission mechanisms are that 1) credit market conditions (e.g. risk spreads) 
are  important  sources  and  indicators  of  macroeconomic  shocks,  2)    the  real  effects  of 
monetary policy are larger and persistent.   
  In this paper we present an econometric analysis of the CCC hypothesis for two EMU 
test countries, Italy and Germany. They are not only two of the largest EMU economies, but 
are also representative of a wider range of bank-based economies (think of Eastern Europe's 
new  entrants  in  the  EMU).  Whereas  both  countries  have  been  subject  to  numerous 
investigations of the traditional demand effects of the credit channel, to our knowledge little 
attention has been devoted to the supply-side effects
3.  
  In this perspective, our econometric analysis is the empirical counterpart of the CCC 
                                                 
2 More recently, there has been growing interest in the cost channel of monetary policy per se, both in partial 
equilibrium  (e.g.  Bart  and  Ramey  (2001))  and  in  general  equilibrium  (e.g.  Ravenna  and  Walsh  (2006), 
Chowdhury et al. (2006)). However, most of these recent models do not treat financial constraints and firms-
banks relationships explicitly, and simply plug the policy rate into the production function or the Phillips 
curve. For the reasons explained below, this is not satisfactory. 
3 As regards Italy, see Fiorentini and Tamborini (2002). Gaiotti and Secchi (2004) find evidence of a cost 
channel of monetary policy at industry-level data. Yet they follow the Barth-Ramey (2001) approach, that is, 
industry partial equilibrium, with no explicit modelling of the credit market. Moreover, they assume imperfect 
competition in such a way that the cost channel is identified by a positive pass-through of  the interest rate on 
prices. A similar framework is adopted by Chowdhury et al. (2006) who estimate New Keynesian Phillips 
Curves augmented with short-term interest rates for a number of industrialized countries. They find evidence 
of a significant cost channel of interest rates for Italy and France, less so for Germany and Japan.  
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model proposed by Tamborini (2009). Unlike the other authors cited, who in various ways 
introduce the CCC into a New-Keynesian model with sticky prices and other "frictions", 
this  model  provides  a  theoretical  assessment  of  the  CCC  in  a  competitive  flex-price 
economy where the only "friction" is the bank-dependency of firms. This approach presents 
some comparative advantages. Firstly, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988, 1993), and Christiano 
et al. (1997), have stressed that, in the presence of the CCC, real effects of monetary policy 
may also arise in a  competitive flex-price economy. According to the latter authors, a 
broader set of stylized facts can be obtained than with sole demand-side effects with sticky 
prices. In particular, 1) monetary policy interventions negatively affect output, inflation and 
real wages;4  2) they have larger effects on output than prices even though the latter are 
flexible, 3) real effects persist in spite of full price adjustment. Tamborini (2009) has shown 
analytically under what testable conditions a CCC model of this type may generate such a 
pattern of macroeconomic relationships. The key lies precisely in the supply-side effects of 
the CCC.  Secondly, the absence of "frictions" other than bank-dependency allows for clear-
cut identification of the presence and strength of the CCC.   
    As  regards  the  econometric  technique,  we  have  opted  for  the  Johansen-Juselius 
cointegrated  VAR  approach  (Johansen  (1996),  Juselius  (2006)).  We  have  chosen  this 
approach because the thrust of the CCC model to be tested is the existence of long-run 
structural relationships between the policy interest rate and the other relevant variables: real 
wages, output and inflation. In addition, the same econometric apparatus can be exploited to 
conduct a formal test of the idea that the interest rate is an instrument of control for the 
central bank (Johansen and Juselius (2003)). 
As regards the time period of analysis, in consideration of the institutional break 
represented by the EMU we have decided to operate on two separate sub-periods for each 
country, 1986:1-1998:12 and 1999:1-2007:9 for Italy, 1990:1-1998:12 and 1999:1-2007:9 
for  Germany.  The  first  sub-period  coincides  with  pre-EMU  life  in  the  so-called  "hard" 
European  Monetary  System  (EMS) (Germany's  sub-period  starts  from  1990 in order  to 
bypass the unification shock, which creates a number of outliers in the data). The second 
sub-period coincides with inception of the EMU and the coming of both countries under the 
control of the European Central Bank (ECB) in orderly operational conditions (that is, prior 
to the bank market turmoil which began in the last quarter of 2007). We expect comparison 
of econometric results across the different sub-periods and countries to be informative about 
whether 
·  the CCC hypothesis holds for both countries 
·  it held in the past but no longer applies after ten years of EMU 
·  there is any informative discrepancy between the observed data on monetary policy 
control by  the  ECB  and  the  inferences  that  can  be  drawn  from  the  estimated  CCC 
model. 
  Our presentation divides into three parts. The first (section 2) sketches the CCC model 
                                                 
4 A well-known shortcoming of the Old and New Keynesian sticky price hypothesis is that it implies that the 
real wages are instead countercyclical after a monetary shock (Christiano et al. (1997)).  
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in order to identify the structural relationships to be examined. The second one (section 3) 
presents the econometric results based on cointegration vectors, which do not reject the 
CCC hypothesis for both Italy and Germany and across sub-periods. The third part (section 
4)  is  devoted  to  policy  implications  according  to  the  Johansen-Juselius  (2003)  control 
theory: that is, a simulation of a rule-based stabilization policy where the control variable 
(the inter-bank rate) is aimed at the target variable of 2% inflation rate. This simulation is 
performed for both Italy and Germany, on the basis of the respective estimated CCC models 
for the EMU sub-period. As a result, we find confirmation that inflation-targeting via inter-
bank rate control, grafted onto the estimated CCC model, would indeed stabilize inflation 
through  structural  shifts  of  the  equilibrium  paths  of  both  output  and  inflation.  The 
simulation  results  are  then  compared  with actual data  generated under the ECB policy. 
Summary and conclusions follow in section 5. 
 
2 The structural relationships identifying the "credit-cost 
channel" 
 
  The key features of CCC models in general are that: 
·  production takes time,  
·  firms need external funds in advance to finance working capital (typically the wage bill)  
·  these funds come from bank credit. 
Consequently, the connection with monetary policy is given by the labour demand function 
of the bank-dependent firm, and the bank-firm relationship is at the centre of the stage. 
According  to  the  competitive  general  equilibrium  characterization  proposed  by 
Tamborini (2009)
5, when firms plan production at any time t for sale at time t, Q(t)t+1, and 
need  external  funds  to  finance  working  capital  (the  wage  bill  for  simplicity),  they  are 
uncertain about their future revenue from output sales. The unit revenue of a firm j at time 
t+1 is a random draw from the probability distribution with density f(P ~
jt+1), cumulative 
function F, and expected value E(P ~
jt+1) = Pt+1 for all j (that is, firms operate with rational 
expectations).  Under costly state verification, the efficient financial contract is a standard 
debt contract with a deposit and lending intermediary. These are commercial banks that 
collect  deposits  from  households  and  extend  loans  to  firms  under  default  risk  (the 
probability that total revenue may fall short of outstanding debt). Hedging is possible by 
borrowing reserves from the central bank at the policy rate kt. As a result, and under suitable 
conditions, all banks charge the same competitive interest rate rt = kt + rt, where rt is the 
risk premium. In this set-up, firms that maximize expected profit plan output up to the point 
where the marginal product of labour equals its expected real cost Gt. This is given by the 
current real wage rate Wt increased by the (gross) expected real interest rate Rt, Gt º  WtRt 
(where Rt º (1 + rt)Et(1 + pt+1)-1 and 1 + pt+1 º Pt+1/Pt). Given a neoclassical production 
function, changes in the determinants of the bank interest rate  affect labour demand and 
                                                 
5 Here we provide only a non-technical description of the model.  Besides the original source, an analytical 
presentation of the model is available in a separate appendix.  
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planned output with negative sign.  
Note  also that  co-movements  in  labour demand  and credit  supply  correspond  to 
equal variations in the wage bill and households' deposits, which are also a component of 
utility-maximizing  consumption  demand.  This,  besides  ensuring  the  (risk-adjusted)  cash 
flow equilibrium of banks, implies that aggregate demand and supply also move in parallel. 
  The thrust of the model is that variations of kt can, under certain function-parametric 
conditions
6,  generate  a  pattern  of  relationships  which  is  consistent  with  the  empirical 
regularities observed in major industrialized countries (Christiano et al. (1997)), i.e.  
    dWt/dkt < 0, dQ(t)t+1/dkt < 0,dpt+1/dkt < 0,  
    |dQ(t)t+1/dkt| > |dpt+1/dkt| 
to the exclusion of ancillary hypotheses like monopolistic competition or price stickiness. 
Note that the usual negative relationships with output and inflation are associated with the 
negative one with the real wage rate, which indicates that the CCC in fact operates through 
the supply side with no frictions. Hence, the identification of the CCC hypothesis hinges on 
this unique pattern of signs of the variables kt and rt in the equations for pt+1, Wt, and 
Q(t)t+1. Overall these results are analogous to those of the New Keynesian CCC model 
developed by De Fiore and Tristani (2009). However, the latter is crucially dependent on 
the non-zero parameter of price stickiness, which is instead excluded from this model
7.  
  Though this is not our main focus here, it is worth noting that the model predicts the 
same pattern of effects for changes in the credit risk premium rt. This feature - which is 
also found by De Fiore and Tristani (2009) -  is relevant to the current debate on the role of 
credit  risk  in  the  business  cycle,  and  on  the  appropriate  response  of  monetary  policy, 
making a clear case for the use of the policy rate as a means to counteract autonomous shifts 
in the credit risk premium. 
 
3. Identification and estimation of the structural relationships  
 
  In this section we present the results of the econometric analysis of the CCC model 
presented above. For the reasons already explained, the model has been estimated for both 
Italy and Germany over two separate sub-periods: 1986:1-1998:12 and 1999:1-2007:9 for 
Italy, 1990:1-1998:12 and 1999:1-2007:9 for Germany. Since our aim was to analyze the 
long-term, structural relationships in a fully specified system, for the reasons stated in the 
                                                 
6 See Tamborini (2009, sec. 4). The relevant conditions result from five structural parameters, the labour input 
coefficient of the production function, the real balance effect and the intertemporal substitution effect in the 
consumption  function,  the  real  wage  elasticity  and  intertemporal  substitution  effect  in  the  labour  supply 
function.  The  model  also  shows  that  different  configurations  of  these  parameters  may  instead  generate 
different macroeconomic outcomes, such as the well-known "price puzzle" (monetary restrictions followed by 
higher prices) pointed out by Sims (1992). 
7 In models with monopolistic competition the effect of a change of interest rates on inflation is dampened or 
even reversed because firms transfer higher or lower interest rates onto higher or lower prices (see also Barth 
and Ramey (2001) and Chowdhury et al. (2006)). Price stickiness further enhances this effect. However, these 
concomitant "frictions" blur the identification of the CCC per se.  
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Introduction we have chosen the structural cointegration approach developed by Johansen 
(1996),  Juselius  (2006)  and  Johansen  and  Juselius  (2003),  for  the  estimation  and 
identification  of  the  long-run  structural  relationships,  of  the  driving  forces  among  the 
theoretically relevant variables, and for the evaluation of the policy variable as a control 
variable of the system
8. Each point is developed in the subsequent paragraphs.   
 
3.1  The data 
  Our econometric exercise has been designed in order to identify a common "core set" 
of variables of the  CCC hypothesis,  while  introducing specific  variables  to  account for 
specific country/period features. 
To  begin  with  the  core  CCC  variables,  a  preliminary  observation  is  that  our 
theoretical focus is on the policy rate kt. Thus, instead of including the rate on bank loans as 
an independent variable, we have directly considered its two components kt and the credit-
risk premium rt. The latter mainly makes it possible to control for autonomous changes in 
credit  conditions.  Hence  rt,  a  problematic  variable  to  measure,  is  not  crucial  for  the 
significance of the model. Secondly, our theoretical model has a forward-looking structure. 
At each point in time, firms plan production on the basis of uncertain future revenue, so that 
their  economic decision  depends on  the  expected price  level  and  therefore  on expected 
inflation. This is an important characteristic of the CCC hypothesis, since it paves the way 
to  bank  dependence  and  default  risk.  Hence  we  have decided  to  replicate  the  forward-
looking  structure  of  the  CCC  hypothesis  in  the  econometric  model  by  introducing 
appropriate leads in the relevant variables.  
     Therefore, the core CCC variables of interest for both countries are: 
·  the (log of) the real wage rate wt, measured by the industrial wage index at the producer 
cost 
·  the monetary policy variable kt, for which we have used a proxy given by the short-term 
inter-bank rate 
·  the credit risk premium rt, not observable, for which we have adopted, again as a proxy, 
a transformation of the spread between the bank lending rate and a reference rate9 
·  the (log of) output qt+s, given by the industrial production index, where s indicates the 
time lead  
·  the inflation rate, pt+s, measured by the consumer price index10. 
                                                 
8 The entire empirical analysis was performed using the CATS software, which needs the RATS package to be 
run. The results are available upon request. 
9 In light of other empirical studies (e.g. Chiades and Gambacorta (2004)) we have opted for slightly different 
reference rates for the two countries, namely, the medium-term yield rate of government bonds for Italy and 
the money market rate for Germany (basically, the reference rate for primary bank loans).  
10 Since the CCC model assumes flexible prices and rational expectations, we have taken the actual inflation 
rate on the same time lead as output as a proxy for the theoretically expected inflation. A time lead of 12 
months has been chosen empirically by means of sensitivity tests. Recall that the time lead s should capture 
the theoretical gestation time of output and the related time-horizon for expected inflation. Consequently, 
gestation time has the same empirical effect as the sticky-price hypothesis: that is, the observed changes in  
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(sources and charts of the variables, for each sub-period, are given in figures 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
  As to the pre-EMU sub-period, it should be borne in mind that Germany and Italy 
differed historically in their conduct of monetary policy. The role of the credit market in the 
monetary  transmission  mechanism  was  carefully  monitored  by  the  Italian  monetary 
authorities, and it was explicitly included in the Bank of Italy's (BoI) econometric model 
(1997a). Direct controls over credit supply were also explicitly considered among the BoI's 
policy  instruments.  By  contrast,  the  Bundesbank  (BB)  officially  endorsed    the  money-
quantity approach rooted in the monetarist tradition. However, the official policy style only 
concealed the importance that the BB attached to the role of credit and bank rates in the 
transmission mechanism. More importantly, the pre-EMU sub-period that we have chosen 
for the two countries saw a substantial convergence between the policy frameworks in the 
two countries, first under the pressure of the exchange-rate constraints of the EMS, and 
subsequently during the transition to the single currency (Angeloni (1994), Visco (1995)). 
In  the  second  half  of  the  1980s,  the  BoI  abandoned  the  pervasive  and  recurrent 
administrative interventions that had characterized the previous decades. In the 1990s, all 
major European central banks moved towards a more or less explicit practice of interest-rate 
control, the well-known "corridor of rates", that was eventually adopted by the ECB (see 
ECB (2008)). Hence we have felt reasonably confident in our choice of applying the same 
structural model to both countries.  
  Yet some contour diversifications have been necessary. The most important one relates 
to the well-known "asymmetry" between Germany and the other countries participating in 
the  EMS.  Germany  had  de  facto  the  power  to  choose  an  independent  monetary  stance 
(domestic  nominal  policy  rate)  while  Italy,  like  all  the  other  N-1  countries,  faced 
constraints on domestic monetary policy and interest rate setting due to strong exchange-
rate targeting and high capital mobility. Therefore, we have included the German inter-bank 
rate, k*
t , in Italy's data set
11. 
  Although Germany's monetary policy was almost unconstrained in the EMS, it was 
nonetheless concerned with the external exchange value of the mark, in particular vis-à-vis 
                                                                                                                                                     
output and prices occur with a time lag after the observed change in the policy rate. 12 months is in fact a 
common time lag associated with the effects of changes in policy rates.   
11 The literature on monetary policy in the EMS (see e.g. De Grauwe (1992)) would predict that the domestic 
interest rate in a country like Italy could not deviate systematically from uncovered parity with Germany, as 
implied by  
    kt - k*t = Et(e ɺ) ® 0 
where Et(e ɺ ) is the expected depreciation rate. However, temporary non-zero interest differentials would still 
be possible as long as the implied expected change in the exchange-rate remained within the band of the 
parity. On this view, a monetary policy shock can be identified by a deviation from uncovered interest parity, 
i.e. a non-zero interest-rate differential. Suppose k*t rises in Germany while kt remains constant in Italy: the 
interest rate differential in Italy falls. Given the commitment to exchange-rate parity, this is perceived as a 
positive monetary shock.  We consequently introduced the two inter-bank rates as two independent variables 
with opposite expected sign, and we let the data say to what extent they actually exerted independent effects. It 
is worth noting that the introduction of the German inter-bank rate substantially improved the overall quality 
of the estimates.  
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the dollar. Hence, we have also added to Germany's data set an exogenous foreign variable 
to control for world monetary conditions, namely the 3-month LIBOR in US dollars, Libt. 
  In the EMU sub-period we have treated the two countries' models symmetrically in 
their monetary part too. In order to give continuity to the data set, we have used for each 
country  the  same  inter-bank  rate  series  of  the  first  sub-period  as  well  as  the  previous 
domestic  reference  rate  to  compute  the  respective  credit-risk  premium.  The  underlying 
assumption is that these rates now respond to the ECB common monetary policy in both 
countries up to unspecified local factors. Like the BB, the ECB, too, should to some extent 
take account of the evolution of monetary rates worldwide. Hence we have also retained the 
LIBOR in US dollars in the set of variables of both countries. 
 
3.2. Econometric results 
  Since  the  Johansen  CVAR  estimation  procedure  is  by  now  standardized,  here  we 
concentrate on the results, whereas statistical details are confined to the footnotes.  
  To  start  with,  for  each  country  we  have  defined  the  same  p-dimensional  (p  =  5) 





t], (i = ITA, GER). To avoid cumbersome 
notation, in what follows we shall drop the country superscript whenever the variable refers 
to  the  country  under  examination.  Then  we  have  assumed  an  unrestricted  vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model written in error correction form (VECM). The model has been 
augmented, in both countries, to include the appropriate country/period exogenous variables 
zt indicated above, and deterministic terms. The resulting general equation is the following:  
(1) 
1 1
y z 1 0 1
1 0
n n






D = D + D + + + + + ∑ ∑ y Γ y Γ z Πx     ΦD ε  , 
where  xt  =[yt,  zt],  ( ) t p IN , e e e e 0   ∼   is  a  vector  of  disturbances,  D  is  the  first  difference 
operator  and  y z      and  i i , , Γ Γ Π Φ  are  matrices  of  coefficients.  The  deterministic  terms 
include a vector of constants m m m m0, a linear trend t restricted in the analysis to the cointegration 
space
12, a vector of intervention dummies Dt.  The singular matrix P P P P, of reduced rank r, has 
the  representation  P P P P  =  a a a ab b b b’,  where  a a a a  and  b b b b  are  matrices  of  full  column  rank  r,  with 
y z ,  b b b b b b b b b b b b   =   ' ' ' .  The  columns  of  b b b b  correspond  to  the  r  cointegrating  relations,  which 
represent the long-run relationships that can be detected among the variables xt ("attractor 
set"),  whereas  the  elements  in  the  columns  of  a a a a  are  the  adjustment  coefficients  of 
endogenous variables towards the long-run relationships. 
 
3.2.1 Italy 1986 - 1998 
  In the model specification search, with zt = [kt
GER], the choice of the dummy variables 
and  of  the  number  n  =  3  of  lags  in  (3.1)  has  been  determined  on  the  basis  of 
misspecification tests
13.   
                                                 
12 Given linear trends in the data, this choice is generally the best specification with which to begin, unless we 
have a strong prior hypothesis that the trends cancel in the cointegration relations. 
13 In order to obtain residuals close to Normality, we introduced five permanent intervention dummies and two 
transitory intervention dummies to account for the exit of the Italian Lira from the EMS in 1992 and for few  
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  In  order  to  determine  the  cointegration  rank  r,  we  have  examined  as  much  data 
information as possible, and not just the formal trace test procedure
14. The latter has given r 
= 2 at a significance level of 5% and r = 3 at 10%, using the simulated critical values. On 
this basis, and in the light of additional statistical information
15 we have been led to accept r 
= 3. 
  As concerns long-run weak exogeneity, with r = 3 our tests have shown that shocks to 
kt were pushing the system in this period, and that inflation, real wages and production 
adjusted  to  long-run  disequilibrium  errors.  These  results  are  consistent  with  our  CCC 
model, which assumes the inter-bank rate to be the exogenous driving variable
16.  
  In order to obtain a fully identified long-run b b b b structure, and given r = 3, we have 
sought  for  at  least  two  restrictions  on  each  relation  in  addition  to  normalization.  The 
unrestricted cointegrating relations have been normalized with respect to the three variables 
that the theory, and preliminary evidence, indicate as "endogenous" [pt+12, wt, qt+12] vis-à-
vis the CCC "explanatory" variables  [kt, rt, kt
GER] and the trend. Identification has then 
been accomplished by using the information coming from the theoretical model
17. Below 
                                                                                                                                                     
other events. The permanent intervention dummies were defined for 1991:1, 1991:5, 1992:7, 1994:4 and 
1995:3. The transitory intervention dummies were defined for shocks of opposite signs in 1992:9-1992:10, and 
in 1993:3-1993:4. The results of misspecification tests for the unrestricted VAR(3) model with dummies have 
been the following: the LM(1) test for first order autocorrelation, asymptotically distributed as a  2
25 c variable, 
is equal to 26.186 with a p-value of 0.398; as concerns residual Normality, the test asymptotically distributed 
as a  2
10 c  variable, is equal to 19.217, with a p-value of 0.038. 
14 It has been shown that the power of the test is often low for many economically interesting alternatives 
when  the  sample  size  is  rather  small.  It  is  therefore  advisable  in  such  cases  to  use  all  the  sources  of 
information to determine the rank. These include the unrestricted characteristic roots of the companion matrix, 
and the graphs of the recursively calculated trace tests. 
15 Starting from the examination of the eigenvalues of the trace test we have obtained four values, 
corresponding to r = 0, 1, 2, 3, quite close to each other, and just one very small value. The modulus 
of the largest unrestricted characteristic root of the companion matrix is 0.872 for r = 3 and 0.909 
for r = 2, indicating r = 3 as preferable. Moreover, inspection of the graphs of the unrestricted 
cointegrating relations has suggested stationarity of the third one. Even the graphs of the recursively 
calculated trace tests exhibit  a clear linear growth for r = 1, 2, 3, suggesting that the first three 
cointegration relations have been quite stable over the sample period. For the other relations the 
trace test components grow more slowly and are not even close to the 5% critical test value.  
16 Assuming r = 3 and exploiting the information given by the estimated Π matrix, whose rows contain some 
tentative  indications  concerning  the  long-run  relations  and their  adjustment dynamics,  we  have  found no 
evidence of long-run relations in the inter-bank rate equation, thus confirming the weak exogeneity of kt. The 
real wage equation and the production equation contain most of the significant coefficients, implying that they 
are more sensitive to long-run disequilibrium, and they prove to be equilibrium correcting. 
17 As shown in Chapter 10 of Juselius (2006), the long-run structure can be identified in the so called reduced 
form (3.1) of the cointegrated VAR model, so that we can test structural hypotheses on the long-run structure 
b b b b  without having jointly to identify the short-run structure. Information provided by the theoretical model is 
that, of the three endogenous variables, one is forward-looking (inflation), one is contemporaneous (wage) and 
one has a gestation period (output). Therefore, we have imposed a "cascade" structure such that the first 
variable affects the others but not the other way round, the second affects the third but not the other way 
round, and the third is affected by the other two.   
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we report the final just-identified structural long-run relations (t-statistics in parentheses) 
together  with  the  value  of  the  LR  test
18,  and  the  adjustment  dynamics  of  the  system 
variables to equilibrium errors: 
 
Table 1. Italy: the estimated identified long-run structure and the estimated adjustment coefficients 
over the sub-period 1986-1998 (bold coefficients denote significance at 10%) 
  12 + pt   t w   12 + t q   t k   t r  
GER
t k   trendt 
509 . 0     , 318 . 2
2
3 = = c p-value  
1 ˆ b b b b   1.000 
 
-  -  3.216 
(3.068) 
-1.995 















   
               




-  0.658 
(3.574) 
0.658 















   
               









(2.585)    
-  -0.002 
(-8.135) 










   
        
These relationships, when isolating on the l.h.s. the normalized variable and moving 
the other variables on the r.h.s. of the relations, are broadly consistent with the theoretical 
model: 
·  the  inter-bank  rate  kt  always  has  the  expected  signs  and  significant  coefficients  on 
inflation, real wage rate and output  
·  correction for uncovered interest parity via the German rate kt
GER also has the expected 
sign (see also fn. 11) (apart from the equation for output where it is constrained to zero), 
but is significant only in the second relation  
·  the proxy for the credit-risk premium rt proves consistent with the CCC hypothesis in 
the real wage equation and in the output equation. 
   As explained previously, the result for the inter-bank rate – in particular that it has a 
negative effect on the real wage rate – can be considered evidence that this variable operates 
through the supply side of the economy in a way that cannot be consistently explained by 
the  nominal  rigidity  or  the  monopolistic  competition  hypotheses  (see  discussion  in 
Tamborini (2009)). 
  From  the  estimated  a a a a  coefficients  we  can  infer  the  adjustment  dynamics.  It  is 
interesting to note that inflation is equilibrium correcting in the first and the third relation; 
real wages are equilibrium correcting only in the second relation; output is adjusting in the 
                                                 
18 The degrees of freedom of the LR test correspond to the weak exogeneity restrictions for the variable kt.  
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equilibrium errors of the first and the third relation, but increasing in the equilibrium errors 
of the second relation; the credit-risk premium is equilibrium correcting in the first and in 
the second relation.  Overall behaviour, however, is stable because of the stronger adjusting 
effects.  The  zero  coefficients  on  the  inter-bank  rate  are  due  to  the  weak  exogeneity 
assumption. These results yield important information on the stability of the system that we 
shall exploit later. 
 
3.2.2  Italy 1999 - 2007 
  On analysing the data set over the period 1999 – 2007, with z't = [Libt], we have found 
evidence  of  I(2)  characteristics  in  particular  for  inflation,  the  inter-bank  rate  and  the 
LIBOR. Following Juselius (2006), we have introduced significant breaks in the linear trend 
specified  at  2001:9  and  2004:4
19.  The  results  of  misspecification  tests,  calculated  on 
residuals, have assessed the adequacy of the VAR specification with n = 1 lag in (3.1)
20.  
  The search procedure for the number of structural cointegrating relations, based on the 
trace test and the additional statistical information as in the preceding sub-period, has shown 
that r = 3 was still acceptable
21. Below we report the final structural long-run relations (t-
statistics in parentheses), together with the value of the LR test for the over-identifying 
restrictions, and the estimated adjustment dynamics. 
  In the first place, the inter-bank rate kt always has the expected signs and significant 
coefficients on inflation, real wage rate and output. This is not the case of the credit-risk 
premium rt, which is significant with the right sign for output, but with the wrong sign for 
inflation and real wage, and for the variable Libt, which is significant with the right sign for 
real wage, but insignificant for inflation. 
  The deterministic components in the first and in the third cointegrating relation are 
broken trends. In the second relation there is no evidence of any significant broken trend; 
therefore, an unrestricted constant characterizes this relation.  From  the  estimated  a a a a 
coefficients we can infer the equilibrium correcting behaviour of inflation, real wages and 
output, while the inter-bank rate is increasing in the equilibrium error of the first relation 
and adjusting in the others, and risk is equilibrium correcting only in the first. 
 
                                                 
19 The statistical significance of the breaks has resulted from the variable exclusion testing provided as an 
automated test procedure in RATS. 
20 In order to obtain residuals close to Normality we have introduced two permanent intervention dummies for 
1999:4 and 1999:10. The misspecification tests for the unrestricted VAR(1) model with dummies have taken 
the  following  values.  The  LM(1)  test  for  first  order  autocorrelation,  asymptotically  distributed  as  a 
2
25 c variable,  is  equal  to  24.700  with  a  p-value  of  0.479.  As  regards  Normality  of  residuals,  the  test, 
asymptotically distributed as a  2
10 c variable, is equal to 18.732, with a p-value of 0.044. 
21 The trace test has given r = 3 at a significance level of 1% and r = 4 at 10%, but with four values of the 
eigenvalues, corresponding to r = 0, 1, 2, 3, three quite high and one smaller. The modulus of the largest 
unrestricted characteristic root of the companion matrix is 0.854 for r = 2, 0.829 for r = 3, and 0.853 for r =  4, 
indicating r = 3 as preferable.  
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Table 2. Italy: the estimated identified long-run structure and the estimated adjustment coefficients 
over the sub-period 1999-2007 (bold coefficients denote significance at 10%) 
  12 + pt   t w   12 + t q   t k   t r   Libt  Dt01:9  Dt04:4  trendt 
2
2 0 696     0 706 . , p-value . c = =  
1 ˆ b b b b   1.000 
 
-  -  0.881 
(6.008) 
-0.316 



















       
                   




-  1.837 
(4.988) 
-0.657 
(-3.563)   
0.722 
(4.160) 
-  -  - 










       
                   









(5.447)    
















       
 
   
3.2.3  Germany 1990 - 1998 
  Plugging  z't  =  [Libt]  into  (1),  the  search  for  structural  cointegrating  relations  for 
Germany has followed the same procedure as for Italy, confirming r = 3 as cointegration 
rank
22. The number n = 2 of lags in (1) has been determined on the basis of misspecification 
tests
23. Below we report the final just-identified structural long-run relations (t-statistics in 
parentheses)  together  with  the  value  of  the  LR  test
24,  and  the  estimated  adjustment 
dynamics. 
  The overall picture appears even more consistent with the CCC hypothesis than in the 
case of Italy. Both the inter-bank rate kt ,and the credit-risk premium rt always have the 
expected, significant coefficients in the inflation, real wage rate and output relations. The 
coefficient associated with the variable LIBOR is significant and shows the expected sign in 
each relation in which it is not restricted
25. 
                                                 
22 The trace test has given r = 2 at a significance level of 5%, but with four eigenvalues, corresponding to r = 
0,  1,  2,  3,  quite  close  to  each  other  and  one  very  small  value.  The  modulus  of  the  largest  unrestricted 
characteristic root of the companion matrix is 0.736 for r = 2, 0.819 for r = 3, and 0.988 for r =  4, indicating r 
= 3 as still reasonable among the alternatives. 
23 We have introduced two permanent intervention dummies for 1991:10 and 1996:1 into the German data-set. 
The values of the misspecification tests for the unrestricted VAR(2) model with dummies are the following: 
the LM(1) test for first order autocorrelation is equal to 33.576 with a p-value of 0.117; the test for residual 
Normality is equal to 26.824, with a p-value of 0.003. Normality is rejected due to excess kurtosis in inflation. 
Because VAR estimates are more sensitive to deviations from Normality due to skewness than to excess 
kurtosis, we have considered the chosen model to be well specified. 
24 The degrees of freedom of the LR test correspond to the weak exogeneity restrictions for the variable kt. 
25 Given that Germany had no explicit non-EMS exchange-rate target, Libt, unlike kt
GER for Italy, should take 
the same sign as the domestic rate.  
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  As  regards  the  adjustment  dynamics,  the  a a a a  coefficients    show  that  inflation  is  not 
significantly equilibrium error correcting; real wages are equilibrium error correcting in the 
second and third relation but increasing in the first relation with a stronger adjusting overall 
effect; output is equilibrium error correcting in the first relation but increasing in the second 
relation; and risk is equilibrium correcting in the third relation. The prevailing equilibrium 
correcting behaviours make the system stable anyway, as implied by its characteristic roots. 
 
Table  3.  Germany:  the  estimated  identified  long-run  structure  and  the  estimated  adjustment 
coefficients over the sub-period 1990-1998 (bold coefficients denote significance at 10%) 
  12 + pt   t w   12 t q +   t k   t r   Libt  trendt 
2
3 3 635     0 304 . , p-value . c = =  




-  0.644 
(2.988) 
0.765 















   
               




-  8.987 
(3.106) 
8. 987 















   
               









(2.693)    
-  -0.004 
(-3.803) 










   
 
3.2.4 Germany 1999 - 2007 
  Also for Germany, we have found evidence of I(2) characteristics  for the inter-bank 
rate and the LIBOR in the EMU subperiod. We have therefore specified a significant break 
in the linear trend at 2005:9. Moreover, we have introduced a mean-shift dummy variable 
starting at 2003/I
26, restricted to the cointegrating relations. The results of misspecification 
tests have assessed the adequacy of the VAR specification with n = 1 lag in (3.1)
27 and the 
choice  of  r  =  3  cointegrating  relations
28.  Below  we  report  the  final  structural  long-run 
                                                 
26 In January 2003 the Bundesbank’s earlier survey of lending and deposit rates was discontinued and replaced 
with  the  new  harmonised  MFI  interest  rate  statistics.  Since  the  two  sets  of  statistics  differ  in  their 
methodology, we have introduced a dummy for the change from the lending rate series SU0004 to lending rate 
series SUD123. 
27 In order to obtain residuals close to Normality we have introduced one permanent intervention dummy for 
1999:9.  The  values  of  the  misspecification  tests  for  the  unrestricted  VAR(1)  model  with  dummies  are 
following: the LM(1) test for first order autocorrelationis equal to 27.466 with a p-value of 0.333; the test for 
residuals' Normality is equal to 10.175, with a p-value of 0.425. 
28  The trace  test  has  indicated  r =  4 at a  significance level  of  1%,  but three  values  of the  eigenvalues, 
corresponding  to  r  =  0,  1,  2,  one  quite  high  and  two  smaller.  The  modulus  of  the  largest  unrestricted 
characteristic root of the companion matrixis 0.906 for r = 2, 0.911 for r = 3, and 0.935 for r =  4, indicating r  
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relations (t-statistics in parentheses), together with the value of the LR test for the over-
identifying restrictions, and the estimated adjustment dynamics. 
   
Table  4.  Germany:  the  estimated  identified  long-run  structure  and  the  estimated  adjustment 
coefficients over the sub-period 1999-2007 (bold coefficients denote significance at 10%) 
  12 + pt   t w   12 + t q   t k   t r   Libt  Ds03:1  Dt05:9  trendt 
2
2 1 273     0 529 . , p-value . c = =  
1 ˆ b b b b   1.000 
 
-  -  0.552 
(2.876) 
0.612 





-  - 










       
                   




-  0.145 
(0.397) 
-1.046 
(-3.240)   
1.329 
(7.163) 














       
                   









(-0.138)   
-  0.041 
(3.000)      
-  -0.0015 
(-10.12) 










       
 
  The results are in line with previous findings, in that the inter-bank rate kt has the 
expected  coefficients  in  every  relation.  However  it  is  not  significant  in  the  real  wage 
relation, which weakens the evidence on the supply-side channel of monetary policy for 
Germany in  the  EMU.  Libt has  the  expected  significant  coefficients in each  relation  in 
which  it  is  not  restricted.  The  credit-risk  premium  rt  has  the  expected,  significant 
coefficient in the inflation relation, significant but with the wrong sign in the real wage 
relation, and not significant in the output relation. 
  The mean-shift dummy significantly affects the first relation and the third relation. The 
deterministic component in the second relation is a broken trend, and in the third relation it 
is a linear trend. 
  To be noted from the estimated  a a a a coefficients is the overall equilibrium correcting 
behaviour, with some non equilibrium correction of the interbank rate. 
 
3.2.5  Preliminary comment 
  In our view, the evidence based on cointegration analysis in the previous section is 
consistent with the CCC hypothesis set out in section 3 according to which a set of long-run 
equilibrium inverse relationships is detectable between the inter-bank rate, on the one hand, 
and inflation, output and real wages, on the other. In textbook graphical terms, shifts in the 
values  of  kt  displace  both  the  "AD  curve" and  the  long-run  "AS  curve"  in  the output-
                                                                                                                                                     
= 3 as a reasonable choice among the alternatives.  
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inflation space, leaving a net effect with negative sign on both inflation and output. Though 
comparable with the empirical results produced by Chowdhury et al. (2006) and De Fiore 
and Tristani (2009), our CCC test may be regarded as stronger in that it does not hinge 
(necessarily)  on  the  ancillary  hypotheses  of  nominal  or  real  rigidities.    We  can  also 
conclude that the CCC is detectable in both Italy and Germany, and that the advent of the 
euro has not created a major structural shift (with weaker evidence for the role of real wages 
in Germany in the EMU sub-period). 
 
4. Is the inter-bank rate a control variable in the system, and 
does "one size fit all"? 
   
  Information  drawn  from  the  foregoing  econometric  analysis  is  relevant  for  the 
transmission of monetary policy in the euro area, and this section is devoted to this issue. 
The close relationship between the control of policy rates and the inter-bank rates within the 
"corridor"  is  the  cornerstone  of  monetary  policy    in  the  euro  area.  Reliance  on  this 
relationship, however, raises two well-known questions: is the inter-bank rate a true control 
variable, and can one single control rule fit all different controlled systems? 
  We have performed a rigorous statistical analysis of these debated issues on the basis of 
the CCC transmission mechanism by drawing on Johansen and Juselius (2003) extension of 
the CVAR methodology to policy control analysis, obviously over the EMU sub-period. 
Their approach hinges on three elements. First, a variable is controllable if it can be made 
stationary  around  a  desired  target  value  by  using  an  instrument  variable.  Second,  a 
necessary condition for a variable to be an instrument is that there be a significant long-run 
impact of a shock to the instrument on the target variable. Third, given controllability, a 
control rule specifies interventions on the instrument conditional on the observed state of 
the  target  variable  relative  to  the  target.  The  first  step  hinges  on  the  results  of  our 
cointegration analysis. The second and third steps will be expounded in this section.  
 
4.1. The "pushing forces" of the system 
  Johansen  and  Juselius  (2003)  policy  control  analysis  starts  from  the  well-known 
distinction  in  the  CVAR  methodology  between  the  "pulling  forces"  and  the  "pushing 
forces"  of  the  system.  The  "pulling  forces"  have  been  identified  in  the  cointegration 
analysis. Information on the "pushing forces" can be gained from the inverted CVAR (1) 
yielding the vector moving average (VMA) representation for  t Dy . Rewriting it in terms of 
the levels of the variables by recursive substitution and  focusing the attention only on the 
common stochastic and deterministic trends characterizing it, we get the following VMA 








= + + ∑ y C ε C   
where the (p´p) matrix C, given the existence of r = 3 cointegrating vectors, has reduced  
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rank (p−r) = 2. Note that it can be written as  y b a b a b a b a ^ ^ = C ' ɶ , a decomposition similar to 
P ab P ab P ab P ab = ', characterizing the CVAR (1)
29. 
  The matrix C plays an important role: its rank corresponds to the number of common 
stochastic  trends,  and  its  elements  convey  information  about  the  long-run  impact  of 
cumulated  shocks  to  the  system  variables.  In  other  words,  the  matrix  C  allows  us  to 
determine  which  empirical  shocks  have  permanent  effects  on  the  system  variables.  An 
eligible policy instrument should therefore be identifiable as a "pushing force" of the system 
by way of matrix C. Given the assumption of exogeneity of zt  (Ericsson et al. (1998), 
Definition 3) and its non controllability, we have focused our attention on the effects of 
unanticipated shocks to the system variables yt. In this way, it has been possible to evaluate 
the effects on inflation and output of unexpected changes in the policy action. Here we only 
report  the  results,  whereas  the  procedure  and  statistics  are  expounded  in  a  separate 
appendix.The results as to identification of common stochastic trends are quite similar and 
stable across the two countries and the two sub-periods. Hence we can summarize them as 
follows. 
·  The  first  common  stochastic  trend  in  all  estimated  models  is  given  either  by  the 
cumulated empirical shocks to kt (in the sub-period 1986 - 1998, when this variable is 
weakly  exogenous),  or  by  the  cumulated  empirical  shocks  to  kt,  with  a  significant 
contribution from shocks to rt (in the EMU sub-period): it can be labelled as a nominal 
stochastic trend. 
·  This stochastic trend has significantly and negatively affected inflation, real wages and 
production  in  the  long  run,  consistently  with  our  model,  in  both  countries  in  both 
periods. 
·  In the first sub-period, the second common stochastic trend is primarily associated with 
the credit-risk premium rt in both countries, with a borderline contribution of real wages 
and inflation in Italy, and of output in Germany.  In the second sub-period, primary 
contribution comes from inflation and real wages in both countries. 
  It can be seen from the corresponding rows of the estimated matrix  C ˆ , reported in 
Table  5  for  Italy  and  in  Table 6  for  Germany,  that  the  target  variables  can  in  fact  be 





Table 5. Italy: the long-run impact on inflation and output of unanticipated shocks to the system over 
the sub-period 1999-2007 (t-values in parentheses, bold coefficients denote significance at 5%) 
 
12 + p e
t  
t w e  
12 + e
t q  
t k e  
t r e  
12 + pt   0.307  0.076  0.028  -0.332  0.169 
                                                 
29 In this decomposition,  1
y y y y  is given by   ( ) b b a b b b a b b b a b b b a b -
^ ^ ^ ^ ' Γ ɶ ,  where  y b b b b ^  and  a a a a^ are 









= - + ∑ Γ I Γ .  
 
17 
(2.292)  (2.427)  (0.970)  (-2.739)  (3.991) 











Table 6. Germany: the long-run impact on inflation and output of unanticipated shocks to the system 
over the sub-period 1999-2007 (t-values in parentheses, bold coefficients denote significance at 5%) 
 
12 + p e
t  
t w e  
12 + e
t q  
t k e  
t r e  





















  The interesting information obtained is that innovations in the inter-bank rate have a 
negative, significant at 5%, long-run impact on inflation and on industrial production in 
both countries with a 12-month time lag. Notably, the size of coefficients is consistent with 
the usual pattern of larger adjustments in quantities than in prices. Johansen and Juselius 
(2003) obtain similar results in the case of the United States, though with the anomaly of a 
positive sign. They conjecture that this anomaly may be due to the absence of the supply 
side in their model; our result suggests that their conjecture may be right. Finally, in the 
case of Germany, though not of Italy, shocks to the credit risk premium have effects similar 
to those of the inter-bank rate, in line with the theoretical model. This indicates that credit 
risk shocks displace credit supply, affect bank interest rates and are transmitted to the real 
economy by way of the CCC. More in-depth analyses and accurate measures of credit risk 
with disaggregate data in the euro area, such as Altunbas et al. (2009), yield broadly the 
same picture. 
 
4.2. Inflation control by means of the inter-bank rate 
  At this point, CVAR econometric analyses usually exploit the additional information 
contained  in  the  estimated  a a a a  coefficient  to  gauge  how  the  system  adjusts  to  shocks 
dynamically - the so-called impulse responses of the system. Here instead we present the 
result of the Johansen-Juselius third step of policy-control analysis, which essentially makes 
use of the same statistical information as an input of a policy control rule aimed at a target 
variable.  Specifically,  we  have  written  a  control  rule  using  the  inter-bank  rate  as  an 
instrument  to  directly  control  inflation
30.  Then  we  have  performed  a  simulation  of  the 
effects of this control rule on the inflation rate and the industrial production index by way of 
the estimated CCC model for both Italy and Germany in the EMU sub-period fed by the 
model's residuals.  
  In order to derive the control rule, we have first assumed that monetary policy sets the 
value of the controlled instrument (ctr) as a reaction to the observed value of the target 
                                                 
30 Hence we have simulated a pure inflation targeting regime, rather than a common Taylor rule where output 
is also a target.  
 
18 
variable with respect to its target value. Then the market reacts, generating a new observed 
value (new). Monetary policy intervenes again on the controlled instrument and then the 
market reacts again. The ordering of the observed values for the process y is therefore the 
following: 














t t y y y y y y y y  , 





t v y y + = .   
Given our estimated VECM model, the intervention  t v  is a complicated matrix function 
that depends on (Johansen and Juselius (2003, p.10)):  
·  the actual discrepancy between the observed and desired value of the target variable; 
·  the observed deviation of the process from the steady state value on the attractor set and 
its short-run adjustment dynamics. 
For each country we report graphs of  




t k k -  on the interbank rate needed to make the inflation rate 
stationary around a target mean of 2% (the baseline is zero, so positive values denote 
contractionary impulses and negative values denote expansionary impulses) 
·  the observed and the new inflation rate  
·  the observed and the new output 
·  the resulting inflation-output scatter (the statistical equivalent of the AS curve) both 
observed and new 
 Table 7 provides the appropriate summary statistics allowing for more precise quantitative 
assessment.   
 
Table 7. Summary statistics of the observed and simulated time series of output and inflation in the 
EMU sub-period 









Mean  4.58  4.61  2.29%  1.97% 
St. Deviation  0.02  0.06  0.38  0.24 
St. Dev. from 2%      0.49  0.24 









Mean  4.65  4.68  1.62%  1.86% 
St. Deviation  0.06  0.06  0.44  0.50 
St. Dev. from 2%      0.58  0.52 
 
  The  simulation  results  serve  two  purposes.  The  first,  and  most  important,  one  is 
assessment of the hypothesis that the inter-bank rate is a means to control inflation with the 
ensuing long-run consequences on output  and inflation. The second is that the simulated 
paths of inflation and output may also provide a benchmark against which their actual paths 
- a result of the single ECB policy on the respective inter-bank rates - can be assessed. If  
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our  estimated  CCC  economies  are  good  statistical  representations  of  the  true  ones, 
differences between estimated and observed variables can be traced back to three factors: 1) 
a country-specific factor (the ECB does not make use of country-specific state information), 
2) a model specification factor (the ECB may not consider the CCC effects at the Union-
area level either), 3) a policy specification factor (the ECB does not follow the same rule as 
our control rule). 
  Firstly, Figures 5 and 6 show that the interventions on the observed inter-bank rate 
dictated by our control rule of the CCC model are neither large nor systematic in both 
countries. This evidence can be read as mutual consistency between the hypothesis that the 
observed  inter-bank  rates  are  indeed  driven  by  at  least  a  component  of  2%  inflation-
targeting and that our control rule fits observed inter-bank rates reasonably well (see also 
Johansen and Juselius (2003) on the US case). However, there are also a few differences 
between Italy and Germany. 
  Figure 5 points up two spells of time in which the control of the CCC model determines 
notable interventions on Italy's inter-bank rate path. First, from early 1999 to end 2001 we 
see  a  sequence  from negative  to positive interventions.  This  indicates a reversal of the 
policy sequence (first a lower then a higher rate) with respect to the observed one (first a 
higher then a lower rate). Second, from mid-2003 onwards we see a sequence of negative 
interventions. This, from 2004, indicates a reversal of the policy stance (from neutral to 
expansionary)  with  respect  to  the  observed  one  (from  neutral  to  contractionary).  As  to 
Germany, Figure 6 presents a similar pattern to Italy’s between 1999 and 2001. We can then 
observe a more systematic alignment with the observed inter-bank rate, apart from a few 
positive and negative spikes - probably due to local shocks.   
  Secondly, Figure 7 and Figure 8 exemplify our foregoing econometric result that the 
inter-bank rate in the CCC model is indeed a means to make the inflation process stationary 
around the 2% target in both countries.  Statistics in Table 7 indicate that the simulated 
inflation  control  is  quite  effective  in  terms  of  standard  deviation  from  target  in  both 
countries, remarkably so for Italy. In the case of Italy, a phase of significant downward 
deviations from the observed inflation path is also observable, which is broadly consistent 
with the simulated inter-bank rate vis-à-vis the actual one (from 1999 to 2003 the policy 
reversal generated by the control rule is consistent with inflation lower than observed). As 
in the case of the inter-bank rate, the path of the simulated  inflation process in Germany is 
closer to the observed one, with the upward spikes in the simulated inter-bank rate in 2002-
2003 corresponding to upward spikes in the simulated inflation rate.    
  Thirdly, Figure 9 and Figure 10 illustrate the effect on output of controlling the inter-
bank rate according to the CCC hypothesis. Again, whereas Germany displays a path of the 
simulated output closer to the observed one - though systematically higher - Italy presents 
quite a different picture. The (moderately) different paths of the controlled inter-bank and 
inflation rates produced by the CCC model with respect to the real data seem to produce 
major systematic differences in the output path. A clear intertemporal relocation emerges 
with lower output in the early years of the EMU against  higher values from 2002 onwards.  
 
20 
Interestingly,  the  simulated  path  of  output  for  Italy  resembles  the  one  observed  for 
Germany.  A  suggested  interpretation  may  be  that  Italy's  puzzling  poor  industrial 
performance after 2002 may not be entirely unrelated with the ECB monetary policy not 
fitting both countries
31.  
  Finally,  Figures  11  and 12 provide visual  evidence  of our  further key  econometric 
finding that inter-bank rate shocks exert long-run effects on the stochastic paths of inflation 
and output represented in the usual inflation-output space. Interpolation lines have been 
added  for  the  reader's  convenience.  The  control  of  inflation  is  obtained  by  structurally 
shifting the inflation-output equilibria. The new equilibrium realizations are located around 
a flat locus corresponding to 2% inflation. This is not, however, a consequence of sticky 
prices but of pure targeting of the 2% inflation rate and the CCC joint effects on aggregate 
demand and supply.  
  Comparison  of  the  simulated  inflation-output  realizations  with  the  ones  observed 
prompts further considerations. The simulated inflation-output loci in both countries appear 
flatter while the dispersion of output  is widened.  For  the  reasons discussed above,  this 
phenomenon is more pronounced for Italy, where the left-hand side of the diagram reflects 
the 1999-01 downward shift of  the  output process,  and  the  right-hand side  its 2002-07 
upward shift, in the simulated economy. From the statistics in Table 7, we can see that the 
observed  and  simulated  time  series  of  Germany’s  output  and  inflation  are  virtually 
undistinguishable,  whereas  in  the  case  of  Italy  output  variability  is  indeed  higher  and 
inflation variability is lower in the simulated time series. An interpretation may be that, 
according to a widespread opinion, the ECB follows flexible inflation targeting, which also 
includes output in the control rule. It is indeed an expected consequence of this policy 
strategy  that output variability is reduced at the expense of inflation variability (Taylor 
(1998)). 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
  In  this  paper  we  have  reported  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  CCC  hypothesis  of 
monetary policy transmission. This hypothesis combines bank credit supply, as a means 
whereby monetary policy affects economic activity ("credit channel"), with interest rates on 
loans as a cost to firms ("cost channel"). The thrust of the model is that firms' reliance on 
bank loans makes both aggregate demand and aggregate supply dependent on monetary 
policy to the extent that this affects bank interest rates. These joint effects yield a pattern of 
relationships  consistent  with  the  empirical  regularities  associated  with  monetary  policy 
interventions, with no recourse to additional non-competitive hypotheses. Moreover, the 
presumption arises that the CCC may also have permanent, rather than transitory, effects on 
                                                 
31 Note that the 2006-07 inflationary phase took off much earlier in Germany than in Italy both in the real data 
and in the simulated ones. The timing of the rise in the observed inter-bank rates follows that of Germany's 
inflation. Accordingly, the simulated control rule yields no interventions on the inter-bank rate for Germany 




  The  statistical  methodology  adopted  has  enabled  us  to  apply  a  single  integrated 
framework  to  the  identification  of  both  structural  relationships  among  the  variable  of 
interest - i.e. the determinants of the long-run stochastic equilibrium path of these variables 
-  and  their  deviations  from  these  paths.  Our  econometric  analysis  supports  the  CCC 
hypothesis for Italy and Germany, two typical bank-based economies, and shows that the 
CCC is detectable in the pre-EMU as well as in the EMU set-up. By way of the CCC 
transmission mechanism, the inter-bank rate is a "pushing force" of the system, with the 
expected negative correlation, of the long-run stochastic equilibrium paths of the real wage 
rate, output and inflation around which transitory dynamics takes place.  
  Secondly, by exploiting the properties of Johansen-Juselius theory of control, we have 
also provided a statistical test and measure that supports the hypothesis that the inter-bank 
rate qualifies as a control variable for output and inflation in the EMU set-up. By simulating 
a  pure  control  rule  of  inflation,  we  have  also  shown  that  control  is  gained  because 
innovations in the inter-bank rate exert a significant long-run impact on both the inflation 
and output stochastic paths. 
  Finally,  upon  comparing  our  simulated  data  with  those  observed  under  the  ECB 
control, we can conclude that the hypotheses that the ECB does control inter-bank interest 
rates in view of a 2% inflation target, and that our estimated control model fits the observed 
inter-bank rates, are mutually supportive. On the other hand, a few significant discrepancies 
between simulated and observed data of inflation and industrial production also support the 
hypothesis  that  the  ECB  follows  flexible,  rather  than  pure,  inflation  targeting.    This  is 
welcome because it mitigates the variability of output that may be induced by a central bank 
following pure inflation targeting and/or ignoring the CCC long-run effects on output. Yet 
our exercise also provides some evidence on the "one size does not fit all" problem that may 
have penalized Italy in the second half of the euro decade. 
  We believe that our main conclusions may be of general interest, at least for countries 
where  firms  significantly  depend  on  bank  credit.  Italy  and  Germany  are  also  major 
economies in the euro area, where inflation-targeting by means of inter-bank rates control is 
one official pillar of monetary policy, and where better understanding of country-specific 
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Figure 1 Italy, sub-period 1986-1998, plots of variables (left to right): inflation rate1; index of industrial 
real wages1; index of industrial production (12 months ahead)1; inter-bank rate2; credit risk premium; 



























Sources: 1IMF, International Financial Statistics; 2Bank of Italy, Monetary Statistics 
 
Figure 2. Italy, sub-period 1999-2007, plots of variables (left to right): inflation rate1; index of industrial 
real  wages1;  index  of  industrial  production  (12  months  ahead)1;  inter-bank  rate1;  credit  risk 


























Sources: 1IMF, International Financial Statistics; 2Eurostat  
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Figure 3. Germany, sub-period 1990-1998, plots of variables (left to right): inflation rate1; index of 
industrial real wages2,1; index of industrial production (12 months ahead)2; inter-bank rate2; credit 

























Sources:  1OECD,  Statistical  Compendium;  2IFS,  International  Financial  Statistics;  3Bundesbank; 
4Economagic.com. 
 
Figure 4. Germany, sub-period 1999-2007, plots of variables (left to right): inflation rate1; index of 
industrial real wages1; index of industrial production (12 months ahead)1; inter-bank rate1; credit risk 
























Sources: 1IFS, International Financial Statistics; 2Bundesbank; 3Eurostat.  
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Figure 5. Italy: representation of the inter-bank rate (solid line) and the derived intervention (dotted 
line) to make inflation stationary around 2%.  












Figure  6.  Germany:  representation  of  the  inter-bank  rate  (solid  line)  and  the  derived  intervention 
(dotted line) to make inflation stationary around 2%. 













Figure 7. Italy: observed (solid line) and "new" inflation (dotted line)  












Figure 8. Germany: observed (solid line) and "new" inflation (dotted line)  











Figure 9. Italy: observed (solid line) and "new" output (dotted line) 










Figure 10. Germany: observed (solid line)  and "new" output (dotted line) 
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∑ u ,  and  y
ˆ b b b b ^ ɶ   as  an  estimate  of  their  loading  matrix,  we  get  for  the  VMA 
representation  of  t y ,  subject  to  the  retrictions  on  a a a a  and  b b b b  previously  imposed,  the 
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∑ε , the cumulated empirical shocks to the inter-bank rate
32, and it can be labelled as a 
nominal  stochastic  trend.  We  can  see  that  this  stochastic  trend  has  significantly  and 
negatively affected inflation, real wages and production, consistently with our model.  
  In order to identify the second common stochastic trend we impose a 0 restriction on 
the coefficient of  kt ˆ e  and a normalization restriction on the coefficient of  t ˆr e  in the second 
row of the  ˆ a a a a ^ '  matrix. Thus we have: 
  2
 (1.888)       (-1.804)            (0.895)
2.012 -0.5043 +0.083 +1.000    
             
, t t wt yt t ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ a e a e a e a e ^ p r = e e e e '  
which shows that it is associated with risk, inflation and real wages, the last two being just 
borderline significant.    
  As a consequence of this identification procedure the  y
ˆ b b b b ^ ɶ  matrix corresponds exactly 
to the fourth and fifth column of the C matrix. Therefore, we can again argue that the long-
run impact of cumulated shocks to the inter-bank rate is negative for inflation, real wages 
and production and positive for risk, while the long-run impact of cumulated shocks to risk 
have a negative long-run impact just on real wages.  
  The estimates of the linear trend effects show positive growth rates for output and real 
wages, , while the interbank-rate shows a negative growth rate. 
  The VMA representation subject to the retrictions on a a a a and b b b b previously imposed, has 
given the following results for Italy over the sub-period 1999-2007: 
                                                 
32  Imposing  the  assumption  of  weak  exogeneity  of  the  inter-bank  rate,  the 























ˆ ˆ w .
q . t ...
k ˆ ˆ . .
.
a e a e a e a e







p      
       
       
        = + +
       
                  r      
∑
∑
 0.332 0.307  
'  1.116 1.027  




  Following the exact identification procedure of normalizing on the coefficient of  kt ˆ e  in 
the first common stochastic trend and on the coefficient of  t ˆ p e  in the second, we have that 
the first common stochastic trend is defined as the cumulated empirical shocks to the inter-
bank rate and to risk, while the second is defined as the cumulated empirical shocks to 
inflation with significant contribution from risk and production: 
  1
 ( 0.359)        ( 1.561)                            ( 3.144)
0.032 0.104 +1.000 0.272  
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- - -
= - e - e e - e '  
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= e e - e + e '  
We can note that the first stochastic trend has significantly and negatively affected inflation, 
real wages and production, as expected, while the second has significantly and negatively 
affected production, but negatively inflation and real wages. Comments related to the matrix 
C in this sub-period have already been made in the paper. 
  The estimates of the linear trend effects show negative growth rates for inflation, output 
and real wages, while the interbank-rate shows a positive growth rate. 
  For  Germany  the  identification  of  the  common  stochastic  and  deterministic  trends 
through the VMA representation with  a a a a and  b b b b restricted, has given the following results 
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∑ε , due to the weak exogeneity of 
t k , and the second common stochastic trend is given by the cumulated following empirical 
shocks: 
  2
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  These shocks are made up mainly by risk, with a borderline significant contribution 
from output.  
  We  can note that the first stochastic trend has significantly and negatively affected 
inflation, real wages and production, as expected, while the second has significantly and 
negatively  affected  inflation  and  production.  From  the  y
ˆ b b b b ^ ɶ   corresponding  in  this  
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identification scheme to the fourth and fifth column of the C matrix, we can again argue 
that the long-run impact of cumulated shocks to the inter-bank rate is negative for inflation, 
real wages and production, and the long-run impact of cumulated empirical shocks to risk is 
negative for inflation and production. 
  The estimates of the linear trend effects show positive growth rates for real wages, 
while output grows at a slower rate. 
  The VMA representation with  a a a a and  b b b b restricted, has given the following results for 
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Following the exact identification procedure of normalizing on the coefficient of  kt ˆ e  in the 
first common stochastic trend and on the coefficient of  t ˆ p e  we have that the first common 
stochastic trend is defined as the cumulated empirical shocks to the inter-bank rate and to 
risk,  while  the  second  is  defined  as  the  cumulated  empirical  shocks  to  inflation  with 
significant contribution from real wages: 
  1
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  The first stochastic trend has significantly and negatively affected inflation, real wages 
and production, as expected, while the second has no significant effects. Comments related 
to the matrix C have already been made in the paper. 
  The estimates of the linear trend effects show negative growth rates for inflation and 
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